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The Abolition of the Mandatory Death Penalty in India and 
Bangladesh: A Comparative Commonwealth Perspective 
Andrew Novak 
Across the Commonwealth, the mandatory death penalty is in decline in 
favor of a capital sentencing regime that delegates sentencing discretion to a trial 
judge. The common law mandatory death penalty for murder simplified the 
sentencing process in resource-constrained legal systems, but it was a crude tool 
that papered over other deficiencies in the criminal justice system. By sweeping 
in mercy killing with sadistic killing and cold-blooded murder with heat-of-
passion murder, the mandatory death penalty over-punished and led to bloated 
death rows even as the number of executions declined across the world.1 
Although an executive or mercy committee could grant clemency or pardon in 
troublesome cases, this failed to reduce all risk of arbitrariness or mistake.2 India 
and Bangladesh are no exception to this Commonwealth-wide trend. Following 
the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Woodson v. North Carolina, 
abolishing the mandatory death penalty for murder in 1976, which led to a 
system of guided sentencing discretion in capital cases, the Supreme Court of 
India did likewise in Mithu v. State of Punjab in 1983.3 Despite the Court’s 
broad-based rationale in Mithu, the legislature continued to pass mandatory 
capital sentencing regimes for specific-intent offenses related to terrorism, drug 
trafficking, and caste violence.4 Two recent decisions of Indian courts, analyzed 
 
* Andrew Novak is Adjunct Professor of Criminology, Law, and Society at George Mason University, 
where he teaches Law and Justice Around the World. He is the author of THE GLOBAL DECLINE OF THE 
MANDATORY DEATH PENALTY: CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGISLATIVE REFORM IN AFRICA, 
ASIA, AND THE CARIBBEAN (2014),  THE DEATH PENALTY IN AFRICA: FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS 
(2014), and a forthcoming book, COMPARATIVE EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PARDON 
POWER AND THE PREROGATIVE OF MERCY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (forthcoming 2015). 
1. For more on the decline in the number of executions worldwide, see Saeed Kamali Dehghan, Amnesty 
International Report Claims Death Penalty is Declining Worldwide, GUARDIAN (Apr. 10, 2013, 3:42 EDT), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/10/death-penalty-declining-worldwide-amnesty. 
2. Rob Turrell, “It’s a Mystery”: The Royal Prerogative of Mercy in England, Canada, and South Africa, 
4 CRIME, HIST. & SOCIETIES 83, 84-88 (2000). 
3. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). Justice Stewart memorably wrote for the Court that 
the mandatory death penalty “treats all persons convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely individual 
human beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the 
penalty of death.” Id. at 304. See also Mithu v. State of Punjab, (1983) 2 S.C.R. 690. This article cites to the 
following print reporters in India: All India Reports (A.I.R.), Supreme Court Reports (S.C.R.), and Supreme 
Court Cases (S.C.C.). In Bangladesh, the following print reporters are used: Bangladesh Law Chronicles 
(B.L.C.), Bangladesh Legal Decisions (B.L.D.), and Dhaka Law Reports (D.L.R.). Where no print reporter 
citation is possible, citation will be made to a case or docket number including the full date and any other 
identifying information. 
4. See, e.g., Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, § 31A Acts of Parliament, 1985 
(India); Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, No. 33, § 2(i), Acts of 
Parliament, 1989; Terrorism and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987, No. 28, § 3(2)(i), Acts of 
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below, have invoked Mithu and determined that the mandatory death penalty 
under these laws is constitutionally inoperable.5 In 2010, the High Court Division 
of Bangladesh also invalidated the mandatory death penalty by relying on the 
reasoning in Mithu.6 
Because most postcolonial Commonwealth constitutions contain 
fundamental rights provisions that include due process rights and a prohibition on 
cruel and degrading punishment, they possess uniform constitutional 
vulnerabilities that make collateral attacks on the death penalty possible.7 In 
addition to India and Bangladesh, human rights litigation against the mandatory 
nature of the death penalty has succeeded in the establishment of discretionary 
capital punishment regimes throughout the English-speaking Caribbean and in 
the African countries of Kenya, Malawi, and Uganda.8 National courts across the 
English-speaking world share death penalty jurisprudence, citing to one another 
and contributing to a corpus of comparative case law, which has succeeded in 
drastically restricting the scope of the death penalty and has created new 
international norms of death penalty due process.9 The most recent contributions 
to this body of transnational jurisprudence include the decisions of the Supreme 
Court of India in Dalbir Singh v. State of Punjab, the Bombay High Court in 
Indian Harm Reduction Network (on behalf of Gulam Mohammed Malik) v. 
Union of India, and the Bangladesh High Court Division in Bangladesh Legal 
Aid and Services Trust (on behalf of Sukur Ali) v. Bangladesh.10 These cases align 
with the global Commonwealth trend finding judicial sentencing discretion in 
capital cases to be constitutionally required. While these decisions generously 
cited case law from around the Commonwealth, they paid particularly close 
attention to jurisprudence on the Indian Subcontinent in a regional sharing 
process that mimics the global one. 
 
Parliament, 1987 (repealed but not retroactive); Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002, No. 15, § 3(2)(a), Acts of 
Parliament, 2002 (repealed but not retroactive); Unlawful Activities Prevention (Amendment) Act, 2004, No. 
29, § 6(b)(i), Acts of Parliament, 2004. 
5. Indian Harm Reduction Network (on behalf of Gulam Mohammed Malik) v. Union of India, Crim. 
Writ Petition No. 1784 of 2010 (June 11, 2010) (Bombay H.C.); State of Punjab v. Dalbir Singh, A.I.R. 2012 
S.C. 1040 (India). 
6. Bangladesh Legal Aid and Services Trust (on behalf of Sukur Ali) v. Bangladesh, (2010) 30 B.L.D. 
194 (H.C.D.). 
7. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE DEATH PENALTY AS CRUEL TREATMENT AND TORTURE: CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT CHALLENGED IN THE WORLD’S COURTS 3-4 (1996). 
8. See, e.g., Reyes v. Queen, [2002] 2 A.C. 259 (P.C.)(appeal taken from Belize); Queen v. Hughes, 
[2002] 2 A.C. 259 (P.C.) (appeal taken from St. Lucia); Fox v. Queen, [2002] A.C. 284 (P.C.) (appeal taken 
from St. Kitts & Nevis); Kafantayeni v. A.G., [2007] M.W.H.C. 1 (Malawi H.C.); A.G. v. Kigula, [2009] 2 
E.A.L.R. 1 (Uganda S.C.); Mutiso v. Republic, [2011] 1 E.A.L.R. 342 (Kenya C.A.). 
9. Paolo Carozza, “My Friend is a Stranger”: The Death Penalty and the Global Ius Commune of Human 
Rights, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1036 (2002). 
10. Singh, A.I.R 2012 S.C. at 1040; Indian Harm Reduction Network (on behalf of Gulam Mohammed 
Malik), Crim Writ Petition No. 1784 of 2010; Bangladesh Legal Aid and Services Trust (on behalf of Sukur 
Ali), 30 B.L.D. at 194. 
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This article will place these three recent decisions in comparative context and 
trace the Indian and Bangladeshi jurisprudence back to the Indian Supreme 
Court’s decision in Mithu, emphasizing the turbulent rise of judicial capital 
sentencing discretion in post-mandatory death penalty regimes. Although Mithu 
confirmed that judicial sentencing discretion was required in murder cases—
murder being a general-intent crime, encompassing a wide range of moral 
culpability—populist legislation continued to enact mandatory death penalties for 
aggravated specific-intent offenses.11 In India, these offenses included caste 
violence, drug trafficking, and death by arms of war, and in Bangladesh, murder 
of a woman or child by explosives or acid, dowry murder, and rape-murder.12 By 
extending Mithu’s reasoning to these specific-intent offenses, the courts of India 
and Bangladesh have closed the door on mandatory capital punishment and 
ensured that judicial sentencing discretion in all capital cases is constitutionally 
required.13 
I. THE DECLINE OF THE MANDATORY DEATH PENALTY IN THE COMMONWEALTH 
The mandatory death penalty is in world-historical decline and has yielded to 
capital sentencing regimes in most of the English-speaking world that allow a 
judge to pass a lesser sentence based on the circumstances of the offense and the 
offender.14 The abolition of mandatory capital punishment, which has had the 
consequence of greatly shrinking the size of death rows and reducing an 
overreliance on executive clemency mechanisms, was the deliberate intention of 
a handful of London-based human rights lawyers.15 This network of lawyers 
 
11. See Mithu v. State of Punjab, (1983) 2 S.C.R. 690; see also supra, note 4 and accompanying text. 
12. See, e.g., Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, § 31A, Acts of Parliament (India); 
Arms Act, 1959, No. 54, as amended by Arms (Amendment) Act, 1988, No. 42, § 6(3), Acts of Parliament, 
1988 (India); Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, No. 33, § 2(i), Acts 
of Parliament (India); Oppression of Women and Children (Special Enactment) Act, No. 18 §§4, 6(2), and 10(1) 
(1995) (Bangl.). 
13. By contrast, consider the ruling of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Ong Ah Chuan v. 
Public Prosecutor, in which the Privy Council upheld the mandatory death penalty for drug trafficking. In dicta, 
the Privy Council appeared to distinguish drug trafficking from murder, noting that some crimes permitted 
“considerable variation in moral blameworthiness, despite the similarity in legal guilt of offenders upon whom 
the same mandatory death penalty must be passed.” For murder, often committed in the heat of passion, “the 
likelihood of this is very real; it is perhaps more theoretical than real in the case of large scale trafficking in 
drugs, a crime of which the motive is cold calculated greed.” Ong Ah Chuan v. Public Prosecutor, [1981] A.C. 
648, 673-74 (P.C. 1980) (appeal taken from Sing.). As stated below, however, the decision is no longer good 
law in the Commonwealth, having been reversed by the Privy Council in a series of challenges arising from the 
Caribbean. 
14. See ANDREW NOVAK, THE GLOBAL DECLINE OF THE MANDATORY DEATH PENALTY: 
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGISLATIVE REFORM IN AFRICA, ASIA, AND THE CARIBBEAN 6-7 
(2014). 
15. This strategy is driven in large part by the Death Penalty Project UK and its executive directors Saul 
Lehrfreund and Parvais Jabbar, as well as UK-based pro bono attorneys and partners on the ground. Rick Lines, 
Litigating Against the Death Penalty for Drug Offences: An Interview with Saul Lehrfreund and Parvais 
Jabbar, 1 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. & DRUG POL’Y 53, 54-5 (2010). 
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helped defend death row inmates in the Caribbean before the Judicial Committee 
of the Privy Council, the highest court for most English-speaking countries in the 
Caribbean basin.16 Bringing challenges before the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, this network 
of lawyers, led by the Death Penalty Project and its partners, clarified the 
obligations of countries that were party to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the American Convention on Human Rights, 
both of which restrict the death penalty to the most serious crimes.17 The 
jurisprudence from these human rights tribunals was persuasive to the Privy 
Council, which extinguished the mandatory death penalty as unconstitutional in 
most of the Commonwealth Caribbean.18 
These lawyers relied on two types of challenges. First, because the 
mandatory death penalty treated all murders the same, it could be too harsh for a 
crime and therefore, cruel and degrading punishment. The seminal Privy Council 
decision in Reyes v. Queen from Belize emphasized this aspect.19 Second, 
because the mandatory death penalty did not offer a defendant a sentencing 
hearing, the penalty violated the right to a fair trial, a holding recognized by the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in Edwards v. Bahamas and other 
cases.20 Following the abolition of the mandatory death penalty in most of the 
Commonwealth Caribbean, the London-based network of human rights lawyers 
worked with allies on the ground to bring successful challenges to the mandatory 
 
16. See generally Laurence R. Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory and 
the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1832, 1865-7 
(2002)(noting the increasingly robust human rights role played by the Privy Council and the eventual backlash 
from Caribbean nations). As a result of this death penalty litigation, Barbados and Belize have adopted the 
Caribbean Court of Justice as their highest court of final appeal, and other Caribbean states may do likewise. 
See Margaret A. Burnham, Indigenous Constitutionalism and the Death Penalty: The Case of the 
Commonwealth Caribbean, 3 INT’L J. CON. L. 582, 584-5 (2005). 
17. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter, ICCPR) art. 6(2), opened for 
signature December 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force March 23, 1976) (restricting the death 
penalty to “the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of the 
crime” and “pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court”); American Convention on Human 
Rights art. 4(2), opened for signature November 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S., O.A.S.T.S. No. 36 (restricting the 
death penalty to “the most serious crimes and pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court and in 
accordance with a law establishing such punishment”). 
18. See, e.g., Thompson v. St. Vincent & Grenadines, U.N. Human Rights. Comm., Communication no. 
806/1998, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/70/D/806/1998 (2000); Chan v. Guyana, U.N. Human Rights. Comm., 
Communication no. 913/2000, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/85/D/913/2000 (2006); Baptiste v. Grenada, Case 11.743, 
Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 38/00, OEA/Ser.L.V.II.106 doc. 3 (1999); McKenzie v. Jamaica, Case 
12.023, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 41/00, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.106 doc. 3 (2000). The Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights also has jurisdiction for cases arising from Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago, and has 
found the mandatory death penalty in these countries out of compliance with the American Convention on 
Human Rights. See Hilare, Constantine & Benjamin v. Trinidad & Tobago, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 94 (June 21, 2002); Boyce v. Barbados, Preliminary Objection, 
Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 169 (Nov. 20, 2007). 
19. Reyes v. Queen, [2002] 2 A.C. 259, [15] (P.C.)(appeal taken from Belize). 
20. Edwards v. Bahamas, Case 12.067, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 48/01, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.111, 
doc. 20 (2000). 
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death penalty before the Constitutional Court of Malawi, the Supreme Court of 
Uganda, and the Court of Appeal of Kenya, each of which established 
discretionary death penalty regimes and ordered the resentencing of all prisoners 
on death row.21 While implementation of these decisions has been slow, they 
were significant victories of human rights litigation that spurred criminal justice 
reforms, such as the adoption of new sentencing guidelines in Uganda.22 
However, similar challenges failed before the Supreme Court of Ghana and the 
Singapore Court of Appeal. While Singapore (and Malaysia) have constitutions 
that differ from the Commonwealth model—lacking a prohibition on cruel, 
inhuman, and degrading punishment and a protection of the right to a fair trial—
the poorly-reasoned Ghana case rejected the emerging Commonwealth consensus 
out of hand as judicially activist in a decision repudiated by the UN Human 
Rights Committee as out of compliance with Ghana’s obligations under the 
ICCPR.23 But even Ghana and Singapore are not immune from this emerging 
trans-Commonwealth norm: in 2012, Singapore initiated a drastic curtailment of 
its mandatory death penalty, including the controversial drug trafficking 
provisions. Similarly, in Ghana, a death penalty moratorium is in place and the 
current government has committed to abolition.24 
These “second-generation” challenges to the mandatory death penalty are not 
new; the defects inherent in a mandatory death regime, including the risk of jury 
nullification, where a jury refuses to convict a guilty defendant in order to avoid 
a death sentence, have been widely known for decades.25 The Privy Council had 
previously rejected challenges to the mandatory death penalty in cases arising 
from Rhodesia and Singapore, as did the Supreme Court of Canada in a 1977 
 
21. Kafantayeni, [2007] MW.H.C. 1 at 6-7; Kigula v. A.G., [2009] 2 E.A.L.R. 1, 17 (Uganda S.C.); 
Mutiso, [2011] 1 E.A.L.R. at 342 (Kenya S.C.). 
22. For the difficulties in implementing these decisions see Sandra Babcock & Ellen Wight McLaughlin, 
Reconciling Human Rights and the Application of the Death Penalty in Malawi: The Unfulfilled Promise of 
Kafantayeni v. Attorney General, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: NEW PERSPECTIVES 181, 195-7 (Peter Hodgkinson 
ed., 2013); Graeme L. Hill, Successful Capital Litigation in Uganda: A Counterintuitive Approach?, in 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: NEW PERSPECTIVES 297, 308-9 (Peter Hodgkinson ed., 2013). For the Ugandan 
sentencing guidelines, see The Constitution (Sentencing Guidelines for Courts of Judicature) (Practice) 
Directions of 2013 (April 26, 2013), available at http://www.jlos.go.ug/index.php/document-centre/document-
centre/doc_download/264-sentencing-guidelines. 
23. See Yong Vui Kong v. Public Prosecutor, [2010] 3 S.L.R. 491 (Sing. C.A.); Dexter Johnson v. 
Republic, [2011] S.C.G.L.R. 601 (Ghana); Johnson v. Ghana,U.N. Human Rights Comm., Communication no. 
2177/2012, UN Doc. CCPR/C/110/D/2177/2012 (March 27, 2014) (U.N.H.R.C.). 
24. For Singapore, see Penal Code (Amendment) Act, 2012, No. 33; Criminal Procedure (Amendment) 
Act, 2012, No. 34, §§ 12-13; Misuse of Drugs (Amendment) Act, 2012, No. 27. For Ghana, see Republic of 
Ghana, White Paper on the Report of the Constitution Review Commission of Inquiry, W.P. No. 1/2012, June 
2012, at 44. 
25. See, e.g., WALTER BERNS, FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: CRIME AND THE MORALITY OF THE DEATH 
PENALTY 181 (1979)(on jury nullification); Note, Discretion and the Constitutionality of the New Death 
Penalty Statutes, 87 HARV. L.REV. 1690, 1712-3, 1715 (1974) (on the transfer of sentencing discretion from the 
judge to prosecutors and mercy committees, increasing the risk of arbitrariness). 
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challenge.26 The United States Supreme Court, however, famously ruled that a 
mandatory death penalty constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of 
the Eighth Amendment.27 Justice Stewart elegantly stated that the punishment 
treated all persons convicted of murder “not as uniquely individual human 
beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the 
blind infliction of the penalty of death.”28 After striking down the common law 
mandatory death penalty, the Court subsequently struck down the narrower 
mandatory death regimes for first-degree murder, murder of a law enforcement 
officer, and finally, murder committed by a prisoner already under a sentence of 
life imprisonment.29 
Like the United States, India’s constitutional abolition of the mandatory 
death penalty preceded the new “second generation” challenges, invalidating the 
mandatory death sentence in 1983, in Mithu v. State of Punjab, citing Woodson 
and other cases.30 As a doctrinal matter, the three decisions explored below 
descend from Mithu’s holding that judicial sentencing discretion in capital cases 
is constitutionally required, rather than evolving directly from the “second 
generation” challenges elsewhere in Africa, the Commonwealth Caribbean, and 
Southeast Asia. However, the holdings of the below-discussed cases coincide 
with the Commonwealth-wide trend to move away from the common law 
mandatory death penalty. Despite their doctrinal reliance on Mithu, these three 
decisions broadly cited and followed recent precedent from around the 
Commonwealth, including the Caribbean and Africa, helping to harmonize 
criminal justice regimes across borders and ensuring that the emerging human 
rights norm that judicial discretion is required in capital cases is adopted in 
domestic law.31 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND THE DEATH PENALTY IN INDIA 
No country in the world that professes to maintain a commitment to legal 
capital punishment executes at a lower rate than India, about once every ten years 
 
26. Queen v. Runyowa, [1967] R.L.R. 42 (P.C.)(appeal taken from Rhodesia & Nyasaland); Ong Ah 
Chuan, A.C. at 648 (appeal taken from Sing.). While Singapore’s constitution did not have a prohibition on 
cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishment, Rhodesia’s did. For Canada, see Miller v. Queen, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 
680 (Can.). In Miller, the Court refused to follow Woodson v. North Carolina by upholding the mandatory 
death penalty for the murder of a law enforcement officer, even though the legislature abolished the death 
penalty the prior year. Also note that Supreme Court Reports (S.C.R.) in this footnote refers to the Canadian 
series and not to the Indian series. 
27. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 280. 
28. Id. at 304. 
29. Stanislaus Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (for first-degree murder); Harry Roberts v. 
Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977) (for intentional murder of a police officer); Sumner v. Shuman, 438 U.S. 66 
(1987) (for a life-term prisoner who commits murder). 
30. Mithu v. State of Punjab, (1983) 2 S.C.R. 690 (India). 
31. NOVAK, supra note 14, at 7. 
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for an annual execution rate of one in more than ten billion per year.32 The death 
penalty is publicly marginal, even though it is regularly imposed, which is the 
result of an embattled criminal justice system that suffers from long delays and 
cumbersome procedures.33 This is true despite India’s high homicide rate, which 
is six times higher than Japan’s, three times higher than Singapore’s, and twice as 
high as China’s. These are three countries with historically more active death 
penalties than India.34 Currently, the death penalty is available under the Indian 
Penal Code for murder, attempted murder by a life convict, abetting any capital 
offense, waging war against the government, abetting mutiny, fabricating false 
evidence in a capital trial, abetting the suicide of a child or insane person, 
kidnapping for ransom, gang robbery involving murder, repeat conviction for 
sexual assault, and criminal conspiracy to commit a capital crime.35 In addition, a 
handful of organized crime and terrorism-related statutes as well as the criminal 
codes of the armed forces authorize the death penalty.36 If anything, the rareness 
of actual executions contributes to the underlying arbitrariness of India’s criminal 
justice system. The system is “lawless in the sense that nothing about the nation’s 
capital jurisprudence can explain who gets sentenced to death or hanged when 
hundreds of equally or more culpable offenders escape the death penalty 
altogether.”37 The two most recent executions were of Pakistani militant 
Mohammed Ajmal Kasab in November 2012, the only surviving perpetrator of 
the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack, and Mohammed Afzal Guru in February 2013, 
 
32. DAVID T. JOHNSON & FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE NEXT FRONTIER: NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 
POLITICAL CHANGE, AND THE DEATH PENALTY IN ASIA 438-40 (2009); for more statistics on executions in 
India, see Death Penalty Worldwide: India, CORNELL UNIV. LAW SCHOOL (Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.death 
penaltyworldwide.org/country-search-post.cfm?country=India. 
33. Julia Eckert, Death and the Nation: State Killing in India, in THE CULTURAL LIVES OF CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 195, 196-7 (Austin Sarat & Christian Boulanger eds., 2005). 
34. David T. Johnson, The Death Penalty in India, in CRIME AND JUSTICE IN INDIA 365, 371-72 (N. 
Prabha Unnithan ed., 2013). 
35. Indian Penal Code Act No. 45 of 1860, §§ 109, 120B(1), 121, 132, 194, 302, 303, 305, 307, 364A, 
and 396, PEN. CODE(1860). 
36. Army Act, 1950, No. 46, Acts of Parliament, 1950 §§ 34, 37, 38, 66 (India); Air Force Act, 1950, No. 
45, Acts of Parliament, 1950 § 34, 37, 38, 68 (India); Navy Act, 1957, No. 62, Acts of Parliament, 1957 §§ 34, 
35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 43, 44, 49, 56, 59, 76 (India). The death penalty is also available for prescribed offenses 
under the Indo-Tibetan Border Police Force Act, 1992, No. 35, Acts of Parliament, 1992 (India); Commission 
of Sati (Prevention) Act, 1987, No. 3, Acts of Parliament, 1988 (India); Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances (Prevention) Act, 1985, No. 61, Acts of Parliament, 1985, as amended 1988 (India); Terrorist and 
Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act,1987, No. 28, Acts of Parliament, 1987 (India); Prevention of Terrorism 
Act, 2002, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2002 (India); Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of 
Atrocities) Act, 1989, No. 33, Acts of Parliament, 1989 (India); Explosive Substances Act, 1908, No. 6, Acts of 
the Imperial Legislative Council, 1908 (India); and Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, 1967, No. 37, Acts of 
Parliament, 1967, as amended 2004. See, Bikramjeet Batra, A Knotty Tale: Understanding the Death Penalty in 
India, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: A HAZARD TO A SUSTAINABLE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM? 214 n.6 (Lill 
Scherdin ed., 2014). Sati refers to the ancient Hindu practice of burning or burying a widow. 
37. JOHNSON & ZIMRING, supra note 32, at 438. 
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convicted of the 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament.38 Prior to this, the most 
recent execution was of Dhananjoy Chatterjee in 2004, the only execution 
between 1997 and Kasab’s in 201239 in a country where 30,000 murders take 
place per year.40 
The Indian Penal Code of 1860 was drafted in tandem with the widespread 
criminal justice reform then taking place in England, including revision of the 
notorious Bloody Code, and the replacement of punishments of the body and 
transportation to a penal colony with imprisonment.41 Having benefited from this 
reform, India and Bangladesh (as part of a unified British India) inherited a 
capital sentencing regime that allowed a judge to consider the circumstances of a 
crime and select a death sentence or a sentence of life imprisonment, though 
death was the rule and life imprisonment the exception.42 This system was revised 
in 1898 to require a judge to articulate why a sentence of life imprisonment was 
chosen, if it was.43 The revision of the Criminal Procedure Code in 1973 reversed 
this presumption, requiring a judge to provide “special reasons” for selecting a 
death sentence.44 However, in limited situations, the mandatory death penalty 
survived. India and Bangladesh, both of which operated under the Indian Penal 
Code of 1860, inherited a mandatory death sentence for life-term prisoners who 
committed murder while incarcerated, a provision originally intended to deter 
attacks on corrections officials (typically Englishmen) in the colonial period.45 
For this crime, no lesser sentence of imprisonment was possible.46 As India’s 
independence in 1947 predated the European Convention on Human Rights, 
which applied to Britain’s colonies upon its entry into force in September 1953 
and formed the template for the drafting of a number of independence 
constitutions, India’s Constitution lacked both a specific prohibition on cruel, 
 
38. Amit Bindal & C. Raj Kumar, Abolition of the Death Penalty in India: Legal, Constitutional, and 
Human Rights Dimensions, in CONFRONTING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN ASIA: HUMAN RIGHTS, POLITICS, AND 
PUBLIC OPINION 135-36 (Roger Hood & Surya Deva eds., 2013). 
39. See, Batra, supra note 36, at 213. 
40. Id.; see also JOHNSON & ZIMRING, supra note 32, at 438. 
41. PETER KING, CRIME, JUSTICE, AND DISCRETION IN ENGLAND, 1740-1820, at 263 (2000); David Skuy, 
Macaulay and the Indian Penal Code of 1862: The Myth of the Inherent Superiority and Modernity of the 
English Legal System Compared to the Indian Legal System in the Nineteenth Century, 32 MOD. ASIAN STUD. 
513, 527-30 (1998). 
42. Indian Penal Code Act, No 45 of 1860, PEN. CODE (1860). 
43. Code of Criminal Procedure Act, No. 5 of 1898 § 367(5) CODE CRIM. PROC. (1898) (India). 
44. Code of Criminal Procedure Act, No. 2 of 1973 § 354(3) CODE CRIM. PROC. (1974) (India). This 
provision states: “When the conviction is for an offence punishable with death or, in the alternative, with 
imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of years, the judgment shall state the reasons for the sentence 
awarded, and, in the case of sentence of death, the special reasons for such a sentence.” Id. 
45. Indian Penal Code Act of 1860 §303. 
46. Id. 
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inhuman, and degrading punishment and a clause upholding the due process of 
law, including the right to a fair trial.47 
Although the Constitution of India does not precisely fit the Commonwealth 
template, its evolution has accorded with the global trend toward restricting the 
death penalty to the most serious crimes.48 According to Article 21 of the 
Constitution of India: “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty 
except according to procedure established by law.”49 As Bindal and Kumar write, 
the drafters of the Indian Constitution were acutely aware of the interpretive 
difficulties of the “due process of law” in the American constitutional context, 
and chose a minimalist formulation after extensive debates in the Constituent 
Assembly.50 According to the Indian Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union 
of India, the procedure prescribed by law under Article 21 had to be “fair, just, 
and reasonable, not fanciful, oppressive or arbitrary,” which imported due 
process principles into the Indian constitution despite the absence of a specific 
clause as such.51 A later case, Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, found that a 
fair, just, and reasonable procedure precluded cruel and degrading punishment, 
again aligning India with an emerging norm of international law even absent an 
explicit constitutional provision.52 
In line with Maneka Gandhi, the Indian Supreme Court has held that public 
executions are unconstitutional, as they are not reasonable as to procedure and 
substance, though the Court has upheld hanging as a method of execution.53 The 
Indian Supreme Court has recognized the “death row syndrome,” referring to the 
mental anguish and suffering caused by undue delay in the execution of a death 
sentence, and has commuted a number of death sentences where the executive 
delayed in the disposal of mercy or clemency petitions. In 1983, the Court ruled 
that where a prisoner had been under sentence of death for eight years, the delay 
in executing the death sentence was unconstitutionally inhuman and degrading.54 
 
47. On the impact of the European Convention of Human Rights in the colonies, see JENNIFER A 
WIDNER, BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW: FRANCIS NYALALI AND THE ROAD TO JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN 
AFRICA 161 (2001). 
48. See ICCPR, supra note 17, at art. 6(2), (restricting death penalty to the “most serious crimes”). 
49. INDIA CONST. art. 21. 
50. Bindal & Kumar, supra note 38, at 125. 
51. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 2 S.C.R. 621, 658 [21]. 
52. Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, (1980) 2 S.C.R. 577, 584 (1979) (India). 
53. Attorney General v. Devi, (1986) S.C. 467 (1985) (India) (on public executions); Deena v. Union of 
India, (1984) S.C.R. 1 (1983) (India) (on the method of execution). 
54. Vatheeswaran v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1983) 2 S.C.R. 348 (India). The Court walked the decision 
back slightly in Sher Singh v. State of Punjab, (1983) 2 S.C.R. 582 (India), in which it overruled Vatheeswaran 
to the extent that the former decision set a strict two-year deadline and found the cause of the delay (even when 
it was the fault of the prisoner) irrelevant. Sher Singh requires that the Court consider the totality of the 
circumstances, including the frivolousness of appeals. Id. The seminal case on the death row phenomenon in 
India is Triveniben v. State of Gujarat, (1989) S.C.R. 509, which holds that the Court may consider the cause of 
extensive delay after a sentence was finally confirmed by the judicial process in order to determine whether the 
case warrants a commutation. 
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Although the Court has resisted imposing a strict time limit and closely parsed 
the reasons for the delay to ensure that the delay was not solely the fault of the 
prisoner, the Court’s decisions on the death row phenomenon align with an 
overwhelming international consensus that undue delay orconditions of death 
row can render an otherwise constitutional sentence cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading.55 This holding has been accepted internationally by the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee, the European Court of Human Rights, the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council, and the highest courts of Canada, Uganda, and 
Zimbabwe, and at least two justices of the United States Supreme Court.56 
Similarly, the Court has also determined that the process of clemency is 
subject to judicial review, finding that a grant of mercy or pardon may not be 
arbitrary or discriminatory under Article 21 and Maneka Gandhi.57 Executive 
clemency is provided for in Article 72(1) of the Constitution of India, which 
protects the right of all convicted criminals to submit mercy petitions.58 In India, 
the mercy process is more bureaucratic than in other Commonwealth countries, 
where an executive has broad discretion. Mercy petitions are first examined by 
the Ministry of Home Affairs, where the Minister makes recommendations on the 
mercy petitions and sends them to the President. “The President must either 
accept the recommendation or return the file once for reconsideration. If the file 
resent with the same recommendation, the President must approve the 
decision . . . .”59 Perhaps because of this limitation on executive power, several of 
India’s presidents have left mercy petitions pending when they questioned the 
safety of the verdict, leading to considerable delays that eventually resulted in the 
Supreme Court’s commutation of the death sentences. For instance, in February 
2014, the Supreme Court commuted the death sentences of the assassins of 
 
55. Some inconsistency in the Court’s decisions is evident. Dhanajoy Chatterjee, for instance, was 
executed in 2004 after spending 10 years on death row and 14 years in prison, with much of the delay the fault 
of state authorities. See Dhanajoy Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal, (2004) 1 S.C.R. 37 (India). Bikramjeet 
Batra outlines a number of cases in which the Court appears to inconsistently apply Triveniben in death row 
“syndrome” or “phenomenon” challenges. Bikramjeet Batra, Don’t Be Cruel: The ‘Death Row Phenomenon’ 
and India’s ‘Delay’ Jurisprudence, in CONFRONTING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN ASIA: HUMAN RIGHTS, 
POLITICS, AND PUBLIC OPINION 287, 301-3 (Roger Hood & Surya Deva eds., 2013). 
56. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. 439 (1989) (establishing undue delay as cruel inhuman 
and degrading in the European Court of Human Rights); Catholic Comm’r for Justice & Peace in Zim. v. Att’y 
Gen. of Zim., (1993) 2 L.R.C. 277 (establishing undue delay as cruel inhuman and degrading in Zimbabwe); 
U.S. v. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283 (Can.) (establishing the death row phenomenon as a factor when considering 
extradition to a country that practices capital punishment in Canada); Pratt and Morgan v. Att’y Gen., [1993] 
U.K.P.C. 1 (Jam.). For the more conservative jurisprudence of the U.N. Human Rights Committee, see, e.g., 
Communication No. 271/1988, Barrett and Sutcliffe v. Jamaica, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 40, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/44/D/271/1988 (1992). See also Batra, supra note 36, at 291-7. In the United States, death 
penalty appeals based on delay are known as Lackey claims after Lackey v. Texas. See Lackey v. Texas, 514 
U.S. 1045, 1045-46 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting to denial of certiorari); see also, Elledgee v. Florida, 525 
U.S. 944, 944-946 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting to the denial of certiorari). 
57. Maru Ram v. Union of India, (1981) 1 S.C.R. 1196, 1240 (1980). 
58. INDIA CONST., art. 72(1). 
59. Batra, supra note 36, at 221. 
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former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, as eleven years had lapsed on their mercy 
petitions.60 In Maru Ram v. Union of India, the Supreme Court ruled that a grant 
of mercy or pardon that was “wholly irrelevant, irrational, discriminatory or mala 
fide” was unconstitutional.61 In a subsequent case, Kehar Singh v. Union of India, 
the Court made clear that only the decision-making process and not the ultimate 
grant or denial of clemency was justiciable.62 Nonetheless, opening the clemency 
process to judicial review helps prevent arbitrariness in executive decision-
making and accords with a growing trend in the Commonwealth toward 
subjecting mercy petitions to judicial oversight.63 
In 1973, the Supreme Court broadly upheld the death penalty as 
constitutional in the case of Jagmohan Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, a decision 
that sought to avoid the backlash triggered in the United States by the suspension 
of the death penalty in Furman v. Georgia a year earlier.64 However, the Court 
came breathtakingly close to abolishing the death penalty in Rajenda Prasad v. 
State of Uttar Pradesh in 1979, only permitting the death penalty to be imposed 
where the accused literally “poses a grave peril to societal survival.”65 Despite 
this sweeping holding, however, the Court walked its jurisprudence back to 
equilibrium in the seminal case on the constitutionality of the death penalty in 
India. In Bachan Singh v State of Punjab, in 1980, the Court crystallized what 
became known as the “rarest of the rare” doctrine, restricting the death penalty to 
only the most heinous crimes.66 Although the Court upheld the death penalty per 
se as constitutional under Article 21, it required the presence of aggravating 
circumstances in order to merit the special punishment of death. Bachan Singh 
also included a strongly articulated dissent by Justice P.N. Bhagwati, who argued 
that the death penalty violated the Constitution. The arbitrariness of judicial 
capital discretion, Justice Bhagwati wrote, violated the constitutional guarantee 
of equal protection under Article 14, and any deterrent rationale underlying the 
punishment did not justify the cruelty of a delayed execution.67 
Three years later, in Macchi Singh v. State of Punjab, the Court defined the 
aggravating and mitigating factors that were to be weighed by the sentencing 
judge, determining that a death sentence was only appropriate where the 
circumstances were unusually heinous such that a sentence of life imprisonment 
 
60. Sriharan v. Union of India, (2014) 4 S.C.C. 242. 
61. Maru Ram, (1981) 1 S.C.R. at 1248. 
62. Kehar Singh v. Union of India, (1989) 3 S.C.R. 1102, 1103. 
63. See, e.g., Lewis v. Att’y Gen. of Jam., [2000] 3 W.L.R. 1785, 1805-6 (Jam.)(finding that a prisoner 
had the right to make representations to a mercy committee, to see all material considered by the committee, 
and even to have an oral hearing). 
64. Jagmohan Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1973) 2 S.C.R. 541 (1972)(India); Furman v. Georgia, 408 
U.S. 238 (1972). 
65. Rajenda Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1979) 3 S.C.R. 78, 112 (India). 
66. Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 S.C.C. 684 (India). 
67. Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1983) 1 S.C.R. 145, 256-371 (1982) (India) (Bhagwati, J., 
dissenting). Note that the dissent was published much later than the majority opinion. 
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was inadequate.68 According to the Court in Macchi Singh, the death penalty was 
only appropriate in narrow circumstances: when the murder was “extremely 
brutal, grotesque, diabolical, revolting, or dastardly”; when it was committed for 
a motive that evinced “total depravity and meanness”; when the victim was a 
minority, an innocent child, or a member of a scheduled caste; and when the 
crime consisted of bride-burning, dowry death, or a multiple, large scale, or 
politically-motivated murder.69 
Undoubtedly, the regime established by Bachan Singh succeeded in 
restricting executions in India to a trickle. As noted, this low rate of executions 
came at a cost, however, as the death penalty became so rare that death sentences 
and executions followed no discernible pattern.70 A number of times, lower courts 
simply cut and pasted the entirety of the legal analysis weighing aggravating and 
mitigating factors from other cases, and came to a rote conclusion.71 Bindal and 
Kumar write that “it is the personal philosophy of the judges rather than any 
sound policy that governs judicial discretion in this area.”72 They describe how 
the Supreme Court refused to consider among the “rarest of the rare,” a brutal 
murder for greed, in which an accused misused a position of trust, but found as 
among the “rarest of the rare” a multiple murder committed for superstitious 
reasons.73 Deva goes even further. Looking at every death sentence reviewed by 
the Supreme Court between January 2000 and October 2011, he documents wild 
inconsistencies in the Court’s reasoning as to what cases constituted the “rarest of 
the rare.” For instance, the Court showed gender insensitivity by consistently 
failing to uphold the death penalty for murders involving the rape of a woman or 
girl, while coming to markedly different conclusions as to the superstitious 
sacrifice of children or honor killings.74 Deva attributes the problem to the 
amorphous nature of the guidelines formulated in Bachan Singh and Macchi 
Singh, and the lack of any normative basis for weighing aggravating and 
mitigating factors.75 
In 2009, the Supreme Court attempted another paradigm shift, introducing a 
narrower and more concrete test in Santosh Bariyar v. State of Maharashtra.76 In 
 
68. Macchi Singh v. State of Punjab, (1983) 3 S.C.R. 413(India). 
69. As summarized in A.G. NOORANI, CHALLENGES TO CIVIL RIGHTS GUARANTEES IN INDIA 122-3 
(2012). 
70. Eckert, supra note 33, at 196. 
71. NOORANI, supra note 69, at 123. 
72. Bindal & Kumar, supra note 38, at 129. 
73. Id., citing Earabhadrappa v. State of Karnataka, (1983) 2 S.C.R. 552 (India) (appellant was domestic 
servant who murdered homeowner and robbed house); Sushil Murmu v. State of Jharkhand, A.I.R. 2004 S.C. 
394 (India) (appellant beheaded 9 year old boy in order to purportedly appease deity). 
74. Surya Deva, Death Penalty in the ‘Rarest of the Rare’ Cases: A Critique of Judicial Choice-Making, 
in CONFRONTING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN ASIA: HUMAN RIGHTS, POLITICS, AND PUBLIC OPINION 252-5 
(Roger Hood & Surya Deva eds., 2013). 
75. Id. at 252 
76. Santosh Bariyar v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 6 S.C.C. 498 (India). 
Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 28 
239 
this case, the Court determined that the prosecution was required to prove by 
leading evidence that there was no possibility of rehabilitation of the accused and 
that life imprisonment would serve no purpose, in order to justify imposition of 
the death penalty.77 The Supreme Court followed Bariyar with Rajesh Kumar v. 
State of Delhi in 2012, emphasizing the reformatory potential of the criminal 
rather than the brutality of the crime in determining whether a murder was among 
the “rarest of the rare,” reversing a death sentence even where the murder itself 
was brutal.78 The regime created by Bariyar and Rajesh Kumar requires evidence 
of the socioeconomic background of the accused and not simply evidence of the 
crime, with the burden of non-reformation of the accused on the state.79 Noorani 
predicted that the Court would walk back from the abolitionist sentiment 
expressed in Bariyar, a prediction that seems likely to come true.80 Indeed, the 
most recent cases from the Supreme Court suggest that it has not consistently 
followed the true spirit of Bariyar and Rajesh Kumar.81 
III. THE ABOLITION OF THE MANDATORY DEATH PENALTY IN INDIA 
With the Supreme Court’s adoption of the “rarest of the rare” doctrine, the 
Court abolished the mandatory death penalty in Mithu v State of Punjab in 1983, 
a challenge to Section 303 of the Indian Penal Code, which authorized a 
mandatory death sentence for a life-term prisoner who committed murder while 
incarcerated. In Mithu, the Court found that a mandatory sentence of death was 
not a just and reasonable procedure under Article 21, as interpreted by Maneka 
Gandhi and Sunil Batra.82 Calling the mandatory death penalty “harsh, unjust, 
and unfair,” Chief Justice Yeshwant Vishnu Chandrachud memorably wrote: 
The legislature cannot make relevant circumstances irrelevant, deprive 
the courts of their legitimate jurisdiction to exercise their discretion not 
to impose the death sentence in appropriate cases, compel them to shut 
their eyes to mitigating circumstances and inflict upon them the dubious 
and unconscionable duty of imposing a pre-ordained sentence of death.83 
In addition, because India’s revised Criminal Procedure Code required 
judges to articulate the “special circumstances” meriting a heightened penalty of 
death, a mandatory death sentence made compliance with this provision 
 
77. Id. 
78. Rajesh Kumar v. State of Delhi, Crim. App. Nos. 1871-2 of 2011 (Sept 28, 2011) (India S.C.). 
79. NOORANI, supra note 69, at 125. 
80. Id. at 132. 
81. See Bindal & Kumar, supra note 38 at 132-33. 
82. Mithu v. State of Punjab (1983) 2 S.C.R. 690, 697-98 (India). 
83. Id. at 692. 
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impossible, as the sentence was automatic.84 According to the Court, this 
aggravated the arbitrariness of the statute by depriving a life-term offender of a 
procedural safeguard provided to all other capital defendants.85 The mere fact that 
a person was under a life sentence did not minimize the importance of other 
mitigating factors that were relevant at sentencing, such as age, provocation, 
emotional disturbance, or minimal participation in a prison riot.86 
The Court also found that Section 303 violated the guarantee of equality 
under Article 14 of the Constitution, as no rational justification existed for 
treating murder by life-term prisoners differently from all other murders.87 The 
Indian Penal Code authorized life imprisonment for crimes such as forgery and 
counterfeiting, which have no bearing on a life-term prisoner’s culpability for 
homicide.88 The Court noted that there “might have been the semblance of some 
logic” if the provision were limited to repeat murderers, such that the intention of 
the legislature was to provide for an enhanced sentence for the second murder.89 
This was not the case with Section 303. A concurrence by Justice O. Chinnappa 
Reddy memorably noted that Section 303 removed the scales of justice from the 
hands of the judge. He wrote: “So final, so irrevocable and so irrestitutable is the 
sentence of death that no law which provides for it without involvement of the 
judicial mind can be said to be fair, just, and reasonable.”90 According to Justice 
Reddy, Bachan Singh upheld the constitutionality of the death penalty in India in 
part on the existence of an alternative sanction of life imprisonment as the 
presumptive punishment for murder.91 However, in the years following Mithu, the 
Indian Parliament passed several new mandatory death statutes, on the theory 
that these narrow, specific-intent crimes required aggravating circumstances and 
involved a limited range of culpability vis-à-vis murder.92 The most recent 
challenges to the mandatory death penalty in India focused on these specific-
intent crimes. 
IV. THE DEATH PENALTY AND SOCIETY IN BANGLADESH 
Unlike the Constitution of India, the more recent 1972 Constitution of 
Bangladesh contained both a prohibition on cruel, inhuman, and degrading 
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88. Mithu, 2 S.C.R. at 708-09 (citing Indian Pen. Code Act, 1860, No. 45, §§ 232, 467). 
89. Id. at 708. 
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92. See Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, No. 65, Acts of Parliament, 1985 (India); 
Arms Act, 1959, No. 54, as amended by Arms (Amendment) Act, 1988, No. 42, Acts of Parliament, 1988 
(India); Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, Acts of Parliament, 1989. 
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treatment, and a clause providing for the due process of law.93 Bangladesh has a 
more robust modern history of capital punishment than India, having carried out 
about five known executions per year between 2005 and 2010, though statistics 
are not publicly released and executions are secret.94 As of 2010, about 90 
prisoners were on death row at one facility outside the capital of Dhaka, and 
roughly 100 to 200 death sentences were handed down each year.95 Bangladesh 
has come in for criticism for its poor juvenile justice system, including the 
possibility that a death sentence could be imposed on a child under the age of 
16.96 The Government of Bangladesh states that the death penalty is an 
“exemplary punishment for heinous crimes such as the throwing of acid, acts of 
terrorism, planned murder, trafficking of drugs, rape, [and] abduction of women 
and children.”97 Although Bangladesh has a relatively new National Human 
Rights Commission, which began operation in December 2008, the Commission 
has not strayed from the official government position on the death penalty, 
failing to protest several high-profile death sentences for those sentenced to 
heinous crimes committed during the 1971 war for independence from Pakistan.98 
Bangladesh authorizes the death penalty for a similar list of crimes as India, 
as descended from the 1860 Penal Code: waging war, abetting mutiny, false 
testimony in a capital case, murder, assisting suicide of a child or insane person, 
aggravated kidnapping of a child, and armed robbery resulting in murder.99 In 
addition, other legislation provides death sentences for sabotage, dealing on the 
black market, counterfeiting, smuggling, poisoning of consumables, a variety of 
firearms- and explosives-related offenses, and terrorism-related crimes.100 The 
Women and Children Repression Prevention Act of 2000 and the Acid Crime 
Control Act of 2002, likewise punish as capital crimes a variety of gender-based 
crimes, such as sexual assault resulting in death, trafficking of women and 
children, or injuring or maiming with acid.101 Currently, the death penalty is only 
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the Imperial Legislative Council, 1884 § 12 (Bangl.); Explosive Substances Act, 1908, No. 6, Acts of the 
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101. Women and Children Repression Prevention Act, No. 8 (2000), §§ 4, 4(2)(ka), 5, 6, 8, 9(2), 
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mandatory for three crimes: murder by a life-term prisoner (Section 303 of the 
Penal Code, the same provision at issue in Mithu), attempted murder by a life-
term prisoner (Section 307 of the Penal Code), and dowry murder under the 
Women and Children Repression Prevention Act.102 This latter act repealed the 
Oppression of Women and Children (Special Enactment) Act of 1995, which 
authorized the mandatory death penalty for murder to extort a higher dowry, 
murder of a woman or child by explosives, acid, or poison, and murder following 
rape.103 As explained below, however, the repeal of this provision was not 
retroactive and some prisoners remained under mandatory death sentences for 
these crimes. 
The death penalty in Bangladesh is deeply troubled. In September 2013, riots 
broke out when the Bangladesh Appellate Division handed down a death 
sentence to Abdul Quader Molla of the opposition Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami, 
for crimes committed during the war of independence from Pakistan in 1971.104 
Molla had been convicted of crimes against humanity and war crimes in February 
2013 and given a life sentence by the International Crimes Tribunal, but due to 
public pressure, the legislation was subsequently amended to provide for the 
death sentence in his case.105 Although human rights organizations condemned 
the Appellate Division’s imposition of the death sentence, Molla was executed in 
December 2013.106 Other controversial convictions have followed. In October 
2013, former Member of Parliament, Salahuddin Quader Chowdhury, was 
sentenced to death by the International Crimes Tribunal for crimes committed 
during the war of independence.107 In January 2014, a trial court handed down a 
death sentence in abstentia to an Islamic militant leader for large-scale arms 
trafficking.108 As in India, Bangladesh reports a high rate of extrajudicial 
executions, including death in police custody.109 The country has also faced 
criticism for its overly broad terrorism laws, inadequate protections from state-
sanctioned torture, and the speed with which a prisoner is executed following 
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denial of a clemency petition.110 Between 1975 and 2008, at least 247 prisoners 
were hanged in Bangladesh.111 Currently, at least 1,500 convicted criminals face 
the death penalty, of whom 950 are in custody and the rest still at large.112 
In line with the jurisprudence of neighboring India, Bangladesh adheres to its 
own version of the “rarest of the rare” doctrine. In Sarder v. State, the Appellate 
Division reduced a death sentence based on the “bitter matrimonial relationship” 
between the appellants’ family and the deceased, noting that the murder 
provision of the Penal Code did “not specify in which case the death sentence 
should be given” but rather left “the matter to the discretion of the court” and 
required that every case “be considered in the facts and circumstances of that 
case only.”113 In a later appeal, where the defendant helped plan but did not 
participate in the actual murder, the Court found that “some extenuating 
circumstances [have] visibly appeared as would permit us to take a lenient view 
in the matter of sentence,” and chose a sentence of life imprisonment over a 
death sentence.114 In 2009, the Appellate Division reversed a death sentence for 
ordinary murder without premeditation, finding that it was not among “the rarest 
of the rare cases,” and the “ends of justice will be met if the sentence of death of 
accused . . . is converted into one of imprisonment for life.”115 
In ordinary murder cases, the Appellate Division requires trial courts to 
weigh aggravating and mitigating factors and determine whether a death sentence 
is appropriate, a similar approach to that of the Indian Supreme Court. 
V. HIGH COURT DIVISION OF BANGLADESH: BANGLADESH LEGAL AID AND 
SERVICES TRUST (ON BEHALF OF SUKUR ALI) V. BANGLADESH (2010) 
Unlike India, Bangladesh maintained the mandatory death sentence for 
murder and attempted murder by a life-term prisoner, as well as a mandatory 
death penalty under the Oppression of Women and Children (Special Enactment) 
Act of 1995, until its repeal in 2000 for three crimes: murder of a woman or child 
using explosives, corrosive substances, or poison; dowry murder, in which a 
woman was killed by her husband or his family after suffering harassment or 
torture to extort a higher dowry; and murder following rape.116 In 1995, Sukur 
Ali, a 14-year-old boy, was sentenced to death under this law for the rape and 
murder of a 7-year-old girl, a sentence that was upheld by the High Court 
 
110. Id. at 23-24, 27, 34-35. 
111. Id. at 26. 
112. Id. 
113. Sarder v. State, (1987) 7 B.L.D. (A.D.) 324, 328. 
114. Abdul Awal v. State, (1998) 18 B.L.D. (H.C.D.) 605, 610. 
115. Sarder v. State, (1987) 7 B.L.D. (A.D.) 324, 328; see also State v. Pinto, (2009) 29 B.L.D. (A.D.) 73. 
116. Oppression of Women and Children (Special Enactment) Act 18 (1995), §§ 4, 6(2), 10(1); see also 
Bangladesh Penal Code, 1860, §§ 303 (murder by life-term prisoner), 307 (attempted murder by life-term 
prisoner). 
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Division on the basis that “[n]o alternative punishment has been provided for the 
offence that the condemned prisoner has been charged and we are left with no 
other discretion but to maintain the sentence if we believe that the prosecution 
has been able to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt.”117 The High Court 
Division refused to defy the language of the statute that provided for the 
mandatory death penalty for anyone guilty of the offense, even a juvenile. The 
decision was later confirmed by the Appellate Division.118 In an original writ filed 
by the Bangladesh Legal Aid and Services Trust (BLAST) on behalf of Sukur 
Ali, the High Court Division invalidated the mandatory death penalty in March 
2010, indicating that the mandatory death penalty was not just struck down for 
offenses under the Oppression of Women and Children (Special Enactment) Act, 
but for offenses under the Bangladesh Penal Code as well.119 
As an initial matter, the petitioners objected to treating Sukur Ali as an adult 
and denying him the more lenient punishment subsequently passed after the 
repeal of the law under which he was charged.120 However, the State pointed out 
that the revised law was purposefully not retroactive, keeping the harsher 
sentences of the former law intact.121 As for the mandatory death sentences still 
provided for under the Bangladesh Penal Code, namely murder and attempted 
murder by life-term prisoners, the State argued that the offender “committed an 
offence over an[d] above the substantive offence for which he had been 
convicted,” a rejection of the Indian Supreme Court’s reasoning in Mithu.122 The 
State also sought to distinguish Mithu by arguing that in India, the normal 
punishment upon conviction for murder is life imprisonment and judges are 
required to give special reasons if they choose to impose a death sentence; by 
contrast, in Bangladesh, a judge must give reasons for selecting either sentence, 
which does not operate as a presumption against death.123 The Court was 
unpersuaded. First, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the death penalty per 
se, but found that a defendant must have the opportunity to put forward 
mitigating evidence in a sentencing hearing.124 The Court also expressed concern 
about the possibility of wrongful convictions in Bangladesh, but noted that 
abolition required public and parliamentary debate, as well as research on 
alternatives.125 
 
117. State v. Sukur Ali, (2004) 9 B.L.C. (H.C.D.) 238, 250. 
118. The decision does not appear to be reported, but is referred to a number of times by the High Court 
Division. Id. at 3-4. The statute itself defines “child” but does not define any limits on the person of the 
offender. See, e.g., Oppression of Women and Children (Special Enactment) Act 18 (1995), §§ 4, 5, 6 (noting 
that “whoever” commits the capital crimes shall be punished with death). 
119. Bangladesh Legal Aid and Services Trust v. Bangl., (2010) 30 B.L.D. (H.C.D.) 194. 
120. Id. at 4, 12. 
121. Id. at 14. 
122. Id. at 15. 
123. Id. at 16 (citing Bangl. Code of Criminal Procedure, § 367(5)). 
124. Id. at 20, 31. 
125. Bangladesh Legal Aid and Services Trust, 30 B.L.D.. at 33. 
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One of the more remarkable aspects of the decision was the extent to which it 
considered jurisprudence from other Commonwealth nations on the 
constitutionality of the mandatory death penalty in addition to Mithu. The Court 
cited to the Privy Council’s decision in Reyes v. Queen (appeal taken from 
Belize) for the proposition that a mandatory sentence of death may be too harsh 
for a crime and consequently cruel, inhuman, and degrading.126 The Court 
carefully noted the slightly different wording of the right to life provisions of the 
Bangladeshi and Belizean constitutions, but indicated that Bangladesh was a 
party to the ICCPR and the country’s constitution contained a prohibition on 
cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishment.127 The Court also referenced Roberts 
v. Louisiana, the companion case of Woodson v. North Carolina, decided by the 
United States Supreme Court in 1976, as well as the Malawian case striking 
down the mandatory death penalty in Kafantayeni and the South African decision 
abolishing capital punishment in Makwanyane.128 
The Court was also receptive to a separation of powers argument, finding 
that a constraint on judicial sentencing discretion unconstitutionally infringed the 
judicial power.129 According to the High Court Division, when the legislature 
prescribed a mandatory punishment, “the hands of the court are thereby tied” and 
the “court becomes a simple rubberstamp [sic] of the legislature” in violation of 
the “duty of the court to take into account [an accused’s] character and 
antecedents in order to come to a just and proper decision.”130 This rationale 
parallels Mithu closely. The Court ensured that its decision was far-reaching by 
specifically addressing not only the repealed provision of dowry murder but also 
the mandatory sentence of death for life-term prisoners who kill: “any mandatory 
provision of law that takes away the discretion of the court and precludes the 
court from coming to a decision which is based on the assessment of all the facts 
and circumstances surrounding any given offence . . . is not permissible under the 
Constitution.”131 Though acknowledging that abolition of the death penalty was a 
decision better left to the legislature, the Court declared Section 6(2) of the 
Oppression of Women and Children (Special Enactment) Act unconstitutional, 
and declared that courts must always have “the discretion to determine what 
punishment a transgressor deserves and to fix the appropriate sentence for the 
crime he is alleged to have committed.”132 Additionally, the decision’s reasoning 
 
126. Id. at 20-21. 
127. Id. at 21, 24. 
128. Id. at 10, 28 (citing Stanislaus Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Kafantayeni v. Att’y Gen., 
[2007] MWHC 1; State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (S. Afr.)). 
129. Id. at 29. 
130. Bangladesh Legal Aid and Services Trust, 30 B.L.D. at 29-30. 
131. Id. at 32. 
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almost certainly encompassed the mandatory death sentence for prisoners under a 
sentence of life imprisonment who committed murder.133 
The High Court Division’s decision in BLAST v. Bangladesh may be 
criticized because it did not fully resolve the situation of petitioner Sukur Ali, a 
juvenile sentenced to death based on a now-repealed law more than a decade ago. 
Instead of reversing his death sentence, the Court hid behind a false guise of 
judicial restraint, leaving it to the Appellate Division to overturn the sentence at 
issue.134 The Court’s final holding is inconsonant with its reasoning, as it only 
issued a stay of execution for two months from the decision despite the troubling 
constitutional defects in Sukur Ali’s sentence. Nonetheless, the decision makes 
Sukur Ali’s resentencing likely, and the Court’s sweeping holding aligns 
Bangladesh with the clear emerging consensus in the Commonwealth that not all 
murders are equally heinous and deserving of death, and that a trial judge is best 
placed to consider the circumstances of the offense and of the offender in 
determining an appropriate sentence. 
VI. BOMBAY HIGH COURT: INDIAN HARM REDUCTION NETWORK (ON BEHALF 
OF GULAM MOHAMMED MALIK) V. UNION OF INDIA (2011) 
In June 2011, the Bombay High Court found the mandatory death penalty, 
under Section 31A of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act of 
1985, unconstitutional in Indian Harm Reduction Network (on behalf of Gulam 
Mohammed Malik) v. Union of India, which involved a challenge to one of the 
specific intent crimes punishable by an automatic death sentence: repeated large-
scale drug trafficking.135 In that case, the Court read the mandatory death 
provision (“shall be punishable with death”) as discretionary (“may be 
punishable with death”) in order to align Section 31A with Article 21 of the 
Constitution of India, becoming the first court in the Commonwealth to find a 
mandatory death penalty for drug trafficking unconstitutional.136 India’s provision 
for an automatic death sentence under the Narcotic and Psychotropic Drugs Act 
only applied to repeat drug traffickers, making it narrower than similar legislation 
in Southeast Asia, such as in Malaysia and Singapore.137 In addition to the Article 
 
133. See id. at 34. 
134. Ridwanul Hoque, Constitutionalism and the Judiciary in Bangladesh, in COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN SOUTH ASIA 303, 325 (Sunil Khilani, Vikram Raghavan & Arun Thiruvengadam eds., 
2013). 
135. Indian Harm Reduction Network (on behalf of Gulam Mohammed Malik) v. Union of India, Crim. 
Writ Petition No. 1784 of 2010 (11 June 2010) (Bombay H.C.). 
136. Id. at 23.  The Sri Lanka Court of Appeal had previously read a mandatory death penalty for drug 
trafficking as discretionary based on statutory interpretation, but that provision used the word “liable,” i.e., 
“shall be liable” to suffer death rather than “shall” suffer death, which is more ambiguous than the Indian 
provision. Van Der Jhultes v. Attorney General, (1989) 1 Sri L.R. 204 (C.A. 1988). 
137. In Malaysia and Singapore, the mandatory death penalty applies to drug traffickers for their first 
offense, based on a statutory schedule of the quantities of the narcotic being trafficked. See Dangerous Drugs 
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21 challenge to the death penalty as a violation of the right to life based on 
Mithu, the petitioners also raised an Article 14 equal protection challenge to the 
drug thresholds and the “repeat” status of the provision. In essence, the 
petitioners argued that the quantity thresholds separating those condemned to 
death from those receiving lesser sentences were arbitrary: trafficking in one 
kilogram of heroin, for instance, triggered a mandatory death sentence, while 
trafficking in 0.99 kilogram would not, even though the culpability was not 
discernibly greater.138 
In addition, the petitioners made a second equality argument. They argued 
that the requirement that the mandatory death penalty for drug trafficking fall 
only on repeat offenders was akin to murder by a life-term prisoner as in Mithu, 
where the Supreme Court determined that the fact that the prisoner was already 
under a life sentence was not a rational ground for determining that the murder 
that he or she committed—to the exclusion of all other murders—was necessarily 
more deserving of death.139 The Court rejected both equality arguments. The 
judges found that the differentia in the law that assigned culpability based on the 
volume of the drug being trafficked was rational. In doing so, the Court followed 
the jurisprudence of the Singapore Court of Appeal, which had determined that 
small-scale and large-scale drug traffickers were not similarly situated in terms of 
culpability, and differentiating between them was constitutional.140 The Court also 
rejected the challenge to the “repeat” status of an offender under Section 31A of 
the Narcotic Drugs Act, finding that a repeated conviction of an offender was not 
an arbitrary distinction and bore a nexus to criminal culpability.141 This is 
probably the right result, or at least it avoids the unconstitutional aspect of 
Section 303 of the Indian Penal Code at issue in Mithu—which authorized the 
 
Act, 1952, No. 234, § 39B (Malay.); Misuse of Drugs Act, 1973, No. 5, as amended by Misuse of Drugs 
(Amendment) Act, 1975, No. 49 (Sing.). In 2012, Singapore enacted a sweeping law reform that removed most 
drug trafficking from the scope of the mandatory death penalty. Misuse of Drugs (Amendment) Act, 2012, No. 
27 (Sing.). 
138. Indian Harm Reduction Network, Crim. Writ Petition No. 1784 of 2010 at 65-66. In any event, 
creating a discretionary death penalty largely solves this problem, as a judge will have discretion to determine 
the culpability of a repeat offender. 
139. See Mithu v. State of Punjab, (1983) 2 S.C.R. 690, 702-03 (India). According to the Court: 
The circumstance that a person is undergoing a sentence of life imprisonment does not minimize the 
importance of mitigating factors which are relevant on the question of sentence which should be 
imposed for the offence committed by him while he is under the sentence of life imprisonment. Indeed, 
a crime committed by a convict within the jail while he is under the sentence of life imprisonment 
may, in certain circumstances, demand and deserve greater consideration, understanding and sympathy 
than the original offence for which he was sentenced to life imprisonment. 
Mithu v. State of Punjab, (1983) 2 S.C.R. 690, 702-03 (India). This rationale is virtually identical to that 
of the U.S. Supreme Court four years later in Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 81 (1987). 
140. Indian Harm Reduction Network, Crim. Writ Petition No. 1784 of 2010 at 69; Yong Vui Kong v. 
Public Prosecutor, [2010] 3 S.L.R. 491, 538-39 (Sing. C.A.) (according to the Court in Yong Vui Kong, two 
drug traffickers carrying different amounts of drugs were not equal at all; they were, in fact, distinguishable, and 
the legislature could assign them different penalties). 
141. Indian Harm Reduction Network, Crim. Writ Petition No. 1784 of 2010 at 67-68. 
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mandatory death penalty for prisoners who committed murder while already 
under a sentence of life imprisonment—namely that the offense underlying the 
life sentence was irrelevant to the culpability of the subsequent murder.142By 
contrast, a second offense for large-scale drug trafficking could be relevant to the 
culpability of the defendant, as suggested by the dicta in Mithu.143 
Although the Court rejected the petitioner’s Article 14 equal protection 
challenges, it followed Mithu closely in determining that Section 31A was 
unconstitutional under Article 21, the right to life provision. The Court stated that 
Section 31A “completely takes away the judicial discretion, nay, abridges the 
entire procedure for administration of criminal justice of weighing the 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances in which the offence was committed as 
well as that of the offender.”144 In accordance with Mithu, the Court found that 
judicial discretion in capital sentencing was required for a just and fair procedure 
under Article 21, as interpreted in Maneka Gandhi. That Section 31A 
distinguished traffickers based on the quantity of drugs being trafficked did not 
make less relevant the requirement to weigh aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances of the offense and of the offender.145 The Court looked to the body 
of comparative jurisprudence on the mandatory death penalty arising from the 
United States and the Commonwealth, including Woodson v. North Carolina and 
similar cases arising out of the Commonwealth Caribbean and East Africa.146 
More troublingly, the Court rejected the petitioner’s argument that even a 
discretionary death penalty per se was disproportionate to drug trafficking 
offenses because the crime did not result in death and was thus not among the 
“rarest of [the] rare.”147 According to the Court, an offense “relating to [a] 
narcotic drug or psychotropic substance is even more heinous than culpable 
homicide, because the latter affects only an individual, while the former affects 
and leaves its deleterious effect on society, besides crippling the economy of the 
nation as well.”148 This uncritical holding is troubling for two reasons. First, the 
distinction between an “individual” crime and a “societal” crime is a false one 
and subject to some manipulation by the Court. For instance, in dicta, the Court 
noted that white collar crime could be a most serious crime, as it is “less 
 
142. According to the Court in Mithu, prescribing a mandatory death sentence for murder for a prisoner 
serving a life sentence for forgery, for instance, would be an arbitrary application of the provision because the 
fact of the forgery had no nexus to the heightened penalty for murder. Mithu, 2 S.C.R. at 697-98. This is similar 
to the reasoning of the U.S. Supreme Court in Sumner v. Shuman, 438 U.S. 66, 81 (1987) (invalidated Nevada’s 
mandatory death penalty for life-term prisoners who committed murder while imprisoned. As Justice Blackmun 
wrote, without consideration of the nature of the underlying life-term offense, “the label ‘life-term inmate’ 
reveals little about the inmate’s record or character”). 
143. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
144. Indian Harm Reduction Network, Crim. Writ Petition No. 1784 of 2010 at 60. 
145. Id. at 61. 
146. Id. at 36-37. 
147. Id. at 16. 
148. Id. at 73. 
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shocking than the crime of murder, but [is] more heinous” than murder.149 Surely, 
the distinction between a merely “shocking” crime and a “heinous” crime is not 
clear and consistent enough to be of constitutional importance. The Court 
manipulated the definition of drug trafficking in a way to presume its 
constitutionality. 
Second, the Court cavalierly disregarded international human rights norms in 
determining that drug trafficking could be a “most serious” crime and therefore 
warranted the death penalty in accordance with the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights.150 By contrast, the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee has determined that drug-related offenses not resulting in death fall 
outside the scope of “most serious crimes,” under the Covenant.151 Although the 
Court’s holding accorded with similar precedent arising from the Singapore 
Court of Appeal, Singapore is not a party to the Covenant.152 This holding is also 
out of sync with the jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court, hardly a 
progressive leader on the topic of capital punishment, which has generally held 
that the death penalty is unconstitutional for crimes not resulting in death.153 The 
death penalty for drug trafficking is deeply problematic because it falls heavily 
on drug “mules” at the expense of drug “lords,” and the Indian court’s decision 
contradicts a growing international trend away from the death penalty for drug 
trafficking.154 
Rather than striking Section 31A completely, as the petitioners argued, the 
Court opted to construe the mandatory sentencing provision as discretionary and 
replaced “shall” with “may” so that a trial court retained discretion to substitute 
death or a lesser punishment depending on the circumstances of the case.155 This 
accords with the Court’s holding that a discretionary death penalty for drug 
 
149. Id. at 77-78. 
150. Indian Harm Reduction Network, Crim. Writ Petition No. 1784 of 2010 at 77. According to the 
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152. Singapore is not bound by the Covenant, but considers drug trafficking to be a “most serious crime.” 
Michael Hor, The Death Penalty in Singapore and International Law, 8 SING. Y.B. INT’L L. 105, 106 (2004). 
153. That is, at least non-military crimes. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977) (invalidating 
death penalty for rape). Coker was a plurality decision, but it was confirmed by a majority in Kennedy v. 
Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (invalidating the death penalty for rape of a child under 12). 
154. See, e.g., Griffith Edwards et al., Drug Trafficking: Time to Abolish the Death Penalty, in 8 INT’L J. 
MENTAL HEALTH ADDICTION 616, 617-18 (2010). Countries such as The Gambia and Nigeria have abolished 
the death penalty for drug trafficking in recent years. ANDREW NOVAK, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AFRICA: 
FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS 76 (2014). 
155. Indian Harm Reduction Network, Crim. Writ Petition No. 1784 of 2010 at 79. 
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trafficking was not unconstitutional.156 Despite this strained holding, the Court’s 
decision in Gulam Mohammed Malik accords with the regime established in 
Mithu, requiring judicial sentencing discretion in every capital case, at least as to 
the mandatory nature of the death sentence under Section 31A.157 
VII. SUPREME COURT OF INDIA: DALBIR SINGH V. STATE OF PUNJAB (2012) 
In February 2012, the Supreme Court of India invalidated the mandatory 
death penalty under the Arms Act, originally passed in 1959 but amended in 
1988, to clarify which weapons were prohibited and to sync provisions on 
possession of prohibited weapons with those on the use of such weapons.158 The 
amendment at Section 27(3) of the Arms Act introduced the mandatory death 
penalty for causing death through acquiring, carrying, manufacturing, or selling 
prohibited arms of war, another piece of specific-intent legislation that was 
passed subsequently to Mithu.159 In this decision, Dalbir Singh v. State of Punjab, 
the Court cited global precedent for the proposition that the mandatory death 
penalty violated the right to a fair trial because it precluded a sentencing hearing 
for a defendant convicted of murder.160 By drawing on the transnational corpus of 
death penalty jurisprudence, the Indian Supreme Court’s decision contributed to 
the harmonization of death penalty regimes across borders and helped integrate 
international human rights norms in domestic law.161 Although legislation to 
repeal Section 27(3) of the Arms Act had been introduced in Parliament and the 
defendant, Dalbir Singh, had been acquitted by the High Court, the Supreme 
Court nonetheless pronounced on the validity of the mandatory death provision.162 
According to the Court, the mandatory nature of the death sentence violated 
constitutionally-protected judicial review of criminal sentences and undermined 
the statutory sentencing structure of the Indian Penal Code and Criminal 
Procedure Code.163 The Court relied on Mithu’s holding that Article 21 of the 
Constitution required consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors in order 
to limit the death sentence only to the most serious or heinous offenses, even for 
narrowly-defined, specific-intent crimes.164 According to the Court, the Arms Act 
prohibited the “use” of any prohibited weapon that “resulted” in death. As the 
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word “use” is undefined in the Act and both words are extremely broad, the 
prohibition fell afoul of the due process test of Article 21 and Maneka Gandhi.165 
In addition to reviewing domestic precedent, the Court engaged in a 
searching analysis of Woodson v. North Carolina and other American decisions. 
The Court also considered the more recent cases from the Privy Council’s 
Caribbean jurisprudence and from the highest courts of Kenya, Malawi, and 
Uganda, which found the mandatory nature of the death sentence 
unconstitutional.166 The Court extensively quoted many of these precedents, 
summarizing the grounds on which they were decided. “It is clear from the 
discussion hereinabove that mandatory death penalty has been found to be 
constitutionally invalid in various jurisdictions where there is an independent 
judiciary and the rights of the citizens are protected in a Constitution,” the Court 
ruled, sensing an emerging global norm.167 The Court distinguished the 
jurisprudence of Malaysia and Singapore, where courts have upheld the 
constitutionality of the mandatory death penalty under constitutions that do not 
explicitly prohibit cruel and degrading punishment or provide due process of law 
protections.168 By contrast, the Court noted, such provisions became part of 
Indian constitutional doctrine through Maneka Gandhi and Sunil Batra.169 
Finding this comparative jurisprudence persuasive, the Court found that the 
mandatory death sentence in the Arms Act of 1959, as amended in 1988, violated 
both the equality provision at Article 14 and the right to life clause at Article 
21.170 If anything, the Court’s review of this foreign case law was wholly 
accepting, almost completely uncritical, and it is not clear from the decision 
whether the Court merely quoted or actually relied on the rationale of the foreign 
decisions, such as that of the Supreme Court of Uganda, which found the 
legislative enactment of a mandatory death penalty to constrain judicial 
discretion and therefore violate the separation of powers.171 
 
165. Id. at [88]. 
166. Dalbir Singh, A.I.R. 2012 at [49-52], [75-76], [80]. See generally also Indian Harm Reduction 
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2015 / The Abolition of the Mandatory Death Penalty in India 
252 
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE FUTURE OF THE  
MANDATORY DEATH PENALTY 
The mandatory sentence of death is on the rapid retreat across the 
Commonwealth, as it conflicts with the emerging consensus that the death 
penalty should be reserved only for the most heinous crimes based on the 
particular characteristics of the offense and the offender.172 The experiences of 
Commonwealth Caribbean and East African courts have succeeded in building a 
corpus of transnational jurisprudence that other Commonwealth courts draw on, 
follow, and distinguish. As the recent case law from India and Bangladesh 
suggests, Global South nations are not just passive recipients of foreign 
jurisprudence from the Global North, but rather active contributors to a 
constitutional sharing process, making their own imprint and ensuring that the 
decline of the death penalty across the globe is as much based on local criminal 
justice cultures and popular demands as on human rights norms of Western 
origin. The decisions of Indian and Bangladeshi courts in Dalbir Singh, Gulam 
Mohammed Malik, and BLAST/Sukur Ali together stand for the emerging 
proposition that the mandatory death penalty violates human rights norms, even 
for specific-intent crimes, such as drug trafficking and terrorist offenses, which 
possess aggravating factors and are typically premeditated, in contrast to the 
broad range of culpability of the crime of murder.173 In this, the decisions provide 
a path forward for other common law nations that possess such laws, including 
Brunei, Malaysia, and Singapore.174 Ultimately, this transnational “sharing” 
process of death penalty jurisprudence is helping to install prevailing norms of 
constitutional due process and human dignity into domestic constitutional 
jurisprudence. 
As a doctrinal matter, the reasoning of these courts is clear that the 
mandatory sentence for death, no matter how narrowly-defined the crime or the 
mental state therein, always violates the right to life provisions of the Indian and 
Bangladeshi constitutions. With the invalidation of the mandatory death penalty 
under Section 303 of the Indian Penal Code, Section 27(3) of the Arms Act, and 
Section 31A of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act of 1985, the 
law is now settled that a mandatory death sentence is never constitutionally 
permissible under the Constitution of India.175 The Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act of 1989 still has the mandatory 
death penalty, but only for an extremely narrow class of crime that is virtually 
never prosecuted: false witness or fabrication of evidence that results in the 
 
172. See, e.g., Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 S.C.C. 684. 
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execution of an innocent person.176 According to Batra, some prisoners may still 
be under a mandatory sentence of death in India for a law that has lapsed, the 
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act of 1985, and may need to 
bring original writs challenging their individual sentences.177 Sukur Ali’s case 
also raises the troubling possibility that other prisoners may be under a 
mandatory sentence of death under now-repealed laws in Bangladesh. 
Nonetheless, the erosion of the mandatory death penalty in the common law 
world is a case study on the mutually reinforcing relationship between 
international human rights law and domestic constitutional law. The prohibition 
on cruel and degrading punishment in international law resulted from a 
prevailing consensus in domestic constitutional systems. In turn, human rights 
litigation in the Caribbean, Africa, and South and Southeast Asia relied on the 
persuasive authority of international law in bringing challenges in domestic 
systems, including in India and Bangladesh, both parties to the ICCPR and other 
human rights instruments.178 The weight of this comparative domestic 
jurisprudence is in turn establishing a new norm of international human rights 
that punishment disproportionate to a crime constitutes cruel, inhuman, and 
degrading punishment, including an automatic death sentence upon conviction 
without regard to the circumstances of the offense or the offender. Even more 
remarkably, this human rights litigation was sponsored by a core group of 
transnational human rights lawyers with the specific agenda of narrowing the 
scope of capital punishment with a view to its total abolition, showing how a 
small group of lawyers can achieve significant criminal justice reform by relying 
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